Tackling China’s Misinformation Campaigns in Taiwan: A Critical Analysis

Tackling China’s Misinformation Campaigns in Taiwan: A Critical Analysis

In the days leading up to Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te’s inauguration on 20 May 2024, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was relatively quiet. But the silence did not last long. On 23 May, the PLA’s Eastern Theatre Command embarked on Joint Sword-2024A — a joint-military drill involving the Army, Navy, Airforce, and rocket force that surrounded Taiwan and showcased Beijing’s firepower.

The main purpose of the military exercise is retribution. It represents Beijing’s displeasure towards President Lai’s inauguration ceremony, which undermined China’s long-held ‘One China’ principle. Compared to his predecessor President Tsai Ing-wen, who adopted more ambiguous terms like ‘mainland’ or the ‘other side of the Strait,’ Lai is far more assertive and has explicitly referred to China as China. In response, China’s Taiwan Affairs Office called President Lai a dangerous separatist, condemning his hardline tendencies that will only bring ‘war and destruction to the island.’

But Beijing’s wrath did not end there. Completing its repertoire of grey zone tactics, the PLA has released a dramatic video that simulates an all-out invasion of Taiwan. Complete with special effects, the video not only amplifies the intended coercive effects of its joint military exercises but also highlights the vital role of influence operations in Beijing’s efforts to achieve reunification.

If the developments surrounding Lai’s inauguration are an indicator of the trajectory of cross-strait relations, it only points to the continued normalization of Beijing’s escalatory and coercive actions against the self-governed island. Influence operations will also become even more central to China’s mission to legitimize its jurisdiction over Taiwan. By co-opting and penetrating the psyche of its domestic population, Beijing aims to ultimately undermine public trust in Taiwan towards its political institutions.

Fortunately, Taiwan has strong stamina when it comes to countering China-sponsored influence operations. After years of experiencing China’s disinformation and misinformation campaigns, the island is home to a vibrant network of traditional media and civil society groups.

But the aftermath of Taiwan’s January 2024 election offers fresh lessons that underscore the enormity and sophistication of China’s evolving influence operations.

Generative artificial intelligence (AI) took center stage during Taiwan’s election season. A smear campaign that used generative AI videos to target former president Tsai-Ing Wen circulated on TikTok and Instagram. According to Taiwan AI Labs, 3.5 per cent of the top 200 videos reshared on Facebook in 2023 were found to be automatically generated using text-to-speech and AI. Conventional fact-checking techniques employed by Taiwanese media organizations and civil society groups could hardly keep up with all the AI-fabricated audio and video content. The mass production and proliferation of AI-generated audio, video, and text have overwhelmed fact-checkers, while new malicious content propagates instantaneously.

Troll groups were also highly active and coordinated. Before the election, more than 14,000 troll accounts were actively propelling narratives like the binary choice of peace and war in the Taiwan Strait and the unreliability of US support for Taiwan. TikTok, and its Chinese version Douyin, were suspected of manipulating their algorithms to promote video and audio content that targeted specific candidates or political parties or highlighted controversial topics such as asymmetry in the Taiwan–US relationship.

Several high-profile influencers were also posting false information that sought to tamper with the integrity of the election process. Such malicious content has led to a high degree of distrust in Taiwan’s electoral systems and procedures.

Given the prevalence of China’s coercive tactics against Taiwan and the rapid explosion of generative AI and algorithmic bias, combined with the unpredictable headwinds in today’s geopolitics, Taiwan needs to reboot its counter-influence operations toolkit.

Taiwan should encourage its leading tech companies to increase participation in global technical standards setting through formal and informal channels. It should also mobilize civil society groups to proactively participate in multi-stakeholder consultations on emerging technologies like generative AI. For instance, the International Telecommunications Union is currently exploring the development of standards and frameworks to detect deepfakes and other forms of malicious AI-generated media. Taiwanese start-ups and civil society groups can share best practices and lessons learned in fighting state-sponsored influence operations.

Because most of the Chinese-linked influence operations propagate faster on social media platforms before being amplified in mainstream media, Taiwan must explore more stringent options to regulate digital platforms to enhance transparency, especially during elections.

It would be strategic for Taiwan to reframe the prevailing narratives that it is a mere pawn of the US–China rivalry or that there is only a binary choice of having peace or war in the Taiwan Strait. In highlighting its role as a major economic and semiconductor powerhouse, Taiwan can strengthen its democratic identity and its right to engage and participate in international debates on pertinent issues like regulating AI, reducing carbon emissions, and even fighting election-related influence operations.

Mark Manantan, Director of Cybersecurity and Critical Technologies at the Pacific Forum, and a non-resident fellow at the Center for Southeast Asian Studies at the National Cheng-chi University, Taiwan, emphasizes the importance of Taiwan’s proactive stance in countering China’s misinformation campaigns. He underscores the need for Taiwan to leverage its technological expertise and civil society networks to combat evolving tactics employed by Beijing in undermining Taiwan’s sovereignty and democratic processes.

In conclusion, the evolving landscape of influence operations poses a significant challenge to Taiwan’s national security and democratic integrity. By adopting a multi-faceted approach that includes technological innovation, enhanced regulatory measures, and strategic narrative reframing, Taiwan can effectively combat China’s misinformation campaigns and safeguard its autonomy in the face of escalating threats from Beijing. As Taiwan navigates the complex dynamics of cross-strait relations, it must remain vigilant and proactive in defending its sovereignty and democratic values against external interference and coercion.